Netanyahu's confidence has Iran feeling nervous.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sounded certain at the United Nations this week. 

Defending the strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Israeli prime minister said the operation was hard to carry out but “one of the easiest decisions” he had made. He then predicted that Iran’s government would fall.

Could he be right? Iran’s leaders have survived months of war, retained the ability to threaten shipping and continued to fight through regional allies. But Netanyahu’s confidence has a basis. Israel and the United States have imposed costs Tehran cannot easily reverse, and they still have a path to a favorable outcome.

Start with the military balance. Iran spent decades building and protecting its nuclear program, missile forces and regional network. The U.S. and Israel have shown they can reach targets Iran considered vital. Netanyahu claimed in his speech that the two countries had crushed major parts of Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. His description is an argument from one of the combatants, and the full extent of the damage remains a matter for verification. Still, Iran must plan for an adversary capable of striking deep inside its territory again.

That advantage does not make another attack inevitable or desirable. It gives Washington and Jerusalem bargaining power. Tehran cannot assume that delay will restore the protection its facilities once enjoyed.

The second source of pressure is economic. The U.S. naval blockade and sanctions have restricted Iran’s access to trade and revenue. Reuters reported earlier this month that shortages of currency and imports were driving prices higher and increasing concern about unrest. Economic hardship alone may not bring down the government; the Revolutionary Guards may choose to endure it. But Tehran’s room to maneuver is shrinking.

Iran’s latest proposal shows both the opportunity and the difficulty. Tehran says it could reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days under a plan that would lift the U.S. blockade, ease oil sanctions and halt hostilities, including in Lebanon. Talks about a phased arrangement have begun. Iran plainly wants relief, but Hormuz remains its strongest bargaining card. A proposal to negotiate is evidence that both sides see costs in continuing the conflict, not proof that either has conceded.

Netanyahu’s third reason for confidence concerns Iran itself. At the U.N., he said the “Tyrants of Tehran” were most afraid of their own people. He held up a Starlink terminal while denouncing internet censorship, then spoke directly to Iranians about a future beyond the present government. He appeared to be making a strategic point: a state can threaten its neighbors while losing the trust of the people it governs.

A desire for freedom does not automatically produce an uprising, and outside leaders cannot predict when a government will collapse. Iranian civilians are bearing much of the economic pain. Their future belongs to them. Netanyahu’s speech identifies a possible vulnerability, not a schedule for regime change.

Victory therefore needs a definition more practical than Iran’s immediate collapse. For the United States and Israel, it could mean a reliably open Hormuz, an end to attacks on ships and neighboring countries, enforceable limits on Iran’s nuclear program, and a government that concludes further aggression will cost more than negotiation. Those outcomes would take hard diplomacy as well as sustained pressure.

The risks are substantial. Iran retains the means to make passage dangerous and its allies can widen the conflict. A deal that reopens the strait without resolving the nuclear question could ease today’s emergency while leaving tomorrow’s intact. Conversely, a refusal to explore any deal could prolong the damage to civilians and the global economy.

Yet Tehran’s ability to inflict pain should not be mistaken for an ability to prevail. The U.S. and Israel have demonstrated military reach; the blockade has given Washington leverage; and Iran is seeking a way out. Netanyahu may be wrong about how soon the regime will fall. He may be right that its leaders face a choice they can no longer postpone. 

If the U.S. and Israel turn their advantages into verifiable security gains, they can still win this conflict.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)